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SMITH, Chief Judge. 
Abdul A. Jaludi, a longtime Citigroup employee, was 
laid off and terminated in 2013 after reporting certain 
improprieties in Citigroup’s internal complaint monitoring 
system.  Jaludi, believing Citigroup had fired him in retaliation 
for his reporting, sued Citigroup under the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962 
(“RICO”), and the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1514A.  Citigroup moved to compel arbitration, relying on 
two Employee Handbooks that contained arbitration 
agreements.  The first of those Handbooks, the 2009 Employee 
Handbook, contained an arbitration agreement requiring 
arbitration of all claims arising out of employment—including 
Sarbanes–Oxley claims. 
In July 2010, Congress passed the Dodd–Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which amended 
Sarbanes–Oxley to prohibit pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate 
whistleblower claims.  Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922, 124 Stat. 
1376, 1848 (2010) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(e)).  In 
2011, Citigroup and Jaludi agreed to the 2011 Employee 
Handbook; the arbitration agreement appended to that 
Handbook excluded “disputes which by statute are not 
arbitrable” and deleted Sarbanes–Oxley from the list of 
arbitrable claims.  Suppl. App. 140.  Nonetheless, the District 
Court held that arbitration was required for all of Jaludi’s 
claims. 
We disagree.  Although Jaludi’s RICO claim falls 
within the scope of either Handbook’s arbitration provision, 
the operative 2011 arbitration agreement supersedes the 2009 
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arbitration agreement and prohibits the arbitration of 
Sarbanes–Oxley claims.  We will therefore affirm in part, 
reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. 
I. 
A.1 
Jaludi began working for Citigroup Technology, Inc. in 
1985.2  Throughout his more than two decades with Citigroup, 
Jaludi rose steadily through the ranks.  Starting as an entry-
level tape operator, he eventually became a senior vice 
president who managed a global team.  Jaludi’s responsibilities 
included troubleshooting complaint monitoring systems, 
merging command centers, and streamlining an application for 
customer statements. 
As part of Jaludi’s role, he was responsible for ensuring 
that problem tickets were created for system- and application-
related problems that could affect customers.  Jaludi made sure 
problems were tracked in the complaint management system, 
                                                 
1 Because the District Court compelled arbitration 
shortly after Jaludi filed his complaint, we derive this 
background from the allegations in the complaint.  No facts 
material to our decision today are in dispute. 
2 Jaludi’s pro se complaint named “Citigroup and 
company or one or more of its direct or indirect subsidiaries.”  
Compl. p. 2, ¶ 2.  Jaludi’s employer was Citigroup Technology, 
Inc., a subsidiary of Citigroup, Inc.  Like the parties, we refer 
to the defendant as Citigroup. 
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resolved, and prevented from recurring.  Citigroup was 
obligated to report severity level one problem tickets to the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency.3  In early 2010, 
Jaludi discovered that problem tickets were being mishandled.  
Jaludi observed that Citigroup was not reporting hundreds of 
level one tickets; instead, Citigroup was deleting these tickets 
or reclassifying them to a lower level to avoid reporting 
obligations.  To make matters worse, Citigroup’s help desks 
refused to even open a level one ticket “unless they absolutely 
had to.”  Compl. ¶ 12. 
Jaludi repeatedly reported these issues to management, 
escalating his complaints up the chain of command.  In early 
2010, Jaludi emailed Citigroup’s then-CEO, Vikram Pandit, to 
complain.  Shortly thereafter, Jaludi was summoned to meet 
with Tony DiSanto, the head of the North America Data 
Center.  DiSanto expressed his displeasure with Jaludi’s 
repeated complaints.  Citigroup management warned Jaludi to 
“keep his mouth shut.”  Id. ¶ 17.  One of Jaludi’s former 
managers told him that DiSanto “hated [Jaludi’s] guts for 
refusing to keep his mouth shut and wanted him fired.”  Id. 
In the second quarter of 2010, Jaludi was demoted.  
Jaludi’s then-supervisor told him that he was more qualified 
than the person who would be supervising him “but that her 
hands were tied.”  Id. ¶ 18.  Jaludi complained about his 
demotion.  Thereafter, in the third quarter of 2010, Jaludi’s 
                                                 
3 These tickets involve problems affecting large dollar 
amounts or numerous customers.  For example, a level one 
ticket might report a problem that prevents a large number of 
customers from withdrawing funds or accessing their accounts. 
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teams were taken away from him.  For a period of two months 
“Jaludi had no staff reporting to him nor was he given any work 
to do.”  Id. ¶ 21. 
Late in the fourth quarter of 2010, Jaludi was transferred 
from the division where he had worked for twenty-two years.  
Jaludi’s new supervisor had been “told to take Jaludi and did 
not know what to do with him.”  Id.  Two months later, a new 
manager was added to work between Jaludi and his supervisor.  
In May 2011, Jaludi was further demoted to an entry-level 
position. 
In the third quarter of 2011, Citigroup held the 
Citigroup Challenge contest to find the best idea for the future 
of banking.  Jaludi’s idea, Family Banking, was selected as the 
co-winner out of 2,500 ideas from 65,000 participants.  Jaludi, 
along with others, presented the winning idea to the CEO in 
New York.  Shortly afterwards, Jaludi was given an 
unsatisfactory performance review for failing to meet the 
company’s expectations. 
In 2012, one of the judges from the Citigroup Challenge 
sought Jaludi’s assistance in reducing customer problems at 
one of the bank’s command centers.  Jaludi reviewed the 
command center’s incident management process and 
discovered that employees were improperly opening and 
categorizing trouble tickets.  Despite Jaludi’s suggestions, the 
leaders of the command center were not amenable to change.  
One manager told Jaludi that the command center would not 
alter its policy because doing so would make metrics look bad 
and require reporting to federal regulators.  In the fourth 
quarter of 2012, Jaludi told a supervisor about the problem and 
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made suggestions for resolving it.  The supervisor ultimately 
refused to discuss the issue with Jaludi, telling him in 
December 2012 that he was wasting everyone’s time. 
On February 20, 2013, Citigroup told Jaludi that he was 
being laid off “due to deteriorating business conditions and 
budget constraints.”  Id. ¶ 39.  Jaludi complained that his layoff 
was retaliatory.  On April 21, 2013, Jaludi was terminated.4 
B. 
Congress enacted Sarbanes–Oxley “[t]o safeguard 
investors in public companies and restore trust in the financial 
markets following the collapse of Enron Corporation.”  Dig. 
Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 773 (2018).  
Sarbanes–Oxley protects whistleblowers of publicly traded 
companies.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a).  Under the Act, 
companies cannot “discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, 
harass, or in any other manner discriminate against an 
                                                 
4 Jaludi alleges that Citigroup’s retaliatory conduct 
persisted after his termination in that Citigroup employees 
have prevented him from finding other employment.  For 
example, in November 2014, a retired co-worker told Jaludi 
that he knew someone at Citigroup who had several job 
openings.  The Citigroup hiring manager—who was unaware 
of the circumstances surrounding Jaludi’s termination—said 
that he would “see about a position for Jaludi.”  Id. ¶ 48.  Then, 
the retired co-worker told Jaludi that the Citigroup hiring 
manager was not permitted to consider Jaludi.  In all, Jaludi 
applied for over a dozen positions within Citigroup but never 
received a response. 
 8 
 
employee in the terms and conditions of employment” in 
retaliation for an employee’s protected conduct.  Id.  Protected 
conduct includes providing information to a supervisor 
“regarding any conduct which the employee reasonably 
believes constitutes a violation” of certain criminal fraud 
statutes, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission rules and 
regulations, or statutes prohibiting fraud against shareholders.  
Id. § 1514A(a)(1).  Prior to Dodd–Frank, employers and 
employees could agree to arbitrate any future Sarbanes–Oxley 
claims. 
Throughout Jaludi’s time at Citigroup, he received 
many iterations of the company’s Employee Handbook, which 
enumerates its policies and guidelines.  In late 2008, Citigroup 
issued the 2009 Employee Handbook, which Jaludi 
acknowledged receiving in December 2008.  The 2009 
Handbook contained an arbitration agreement, which was set 
forth in an appendix.  The 2009 arbitration agreement 
expressly identifies Sarbanes–Oxley claims as arbitrable 
disputes and requires their referral to arbitration. 
On July 21, 2010, Congress enacted Dodd–Frank.  
“Passed in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, Dodd–Frank 
aimed to promote the financial stability of the United States by 
improving accountability and transparency in the financial 
system.”  Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., 138 S. Ct. at 773 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Dodd–Frank amended Sarbanes–
Oxley’s whistleblower provision to prohibit pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(e)(2) 
(providing that “[n]o predispute arbitration agreement shall be 
valid or enforceable, if the agreement requires arbitration of a 
dispute arising under this section”). 
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After Dodd–Frank was enacted, Citigroup revised its 
Employee Handbook.  The 2011 Handbook, which Jaludi 
acknowledged in December 2010, also includes an arbitration 
agreement, set forth in an appendix, that excludes “disputes 
which by statute are not arbitrable.”  Suppl. App. 140.  In 
addition, the 2011 arbitration agreement neither identifies 
Sarbanes–Oxley claims by name nor mandates, as its 
predecessor did, the arbitration of such claims.  The 2011 
Handbook expressly provides that it supersedes any prior, 
inconsistent policies or Handbooks. 
C. 
In October 2015, Jaludi filed a pro se complaint in the 
United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania asserting claims under RICO and Sarbanes–
Oxley.  In January 2016, Citigroup moved to compel 
arbitration of both claims.5 
In June 2016, the Magistrate Judge to whom the case 
was referred entered a report and recommendation (“R&R”); 
the R&R recommended that the District Court compel 
                                                 
5 Shortly after the motion to compel arbitration was 
fully briefed, Jaludi filed a motion for summary judgment.  
Citigroup moved to strike the motion for summary judgment, 
which the Magistrate Judge granted because the motion was 
premature.  Jaludi appealed the Magistrate Judge’s order 
striking his motion for summary judgment.  A panel of this 
Court dismissed that appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.  
Order at 1, Jaludi v. Citigroup, No. 16-3167 (3d Cir. Oct. 5, 
2016). 
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arbitration of Jaludi’s RICO claim but not of his Sarbanes–
Oxley claim.  The Magistrate Judge believed that the 2011 
arbitration agreement did not supersede the 2009 arbitration 
agreement; instead, both policies applied.  The Magistrate 
Judge reasoned that Jaludi’s Sarbanes–Oxley claim was not 
subject to arbitration because it accrued after the effective date 
of Dodd–Frank.  Both parties objected to the R&R. 
In August 2016, the District Court sustained Citigroup’s 
objections to the R&R and overruled those of Jaludi.  The 
Court granted the motion to compel arbitration as to both of 
Jaludi’s claims.  The District Court found no error in the 
Magistrate Judge’s determination that the 2011 agreement “did 
not supersede” the 2009 agreement and that, “instead, the 
Policies are mutually exclusive with [Jaludi’s] claims subject 
to arbitration under either or both.”  App. 13.  The Court 
concluded that applying Dodd–Frank to Jaludi’s Sarbanes–
Oxley claim would be impermissibly retroactive. 
Jaludi timely appealed.6  The District Court had 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we exercise 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
                                                 
6 Initially, Jaludi pursued his appeal pro se.  In May 
2017, a panel of this Court directed the Clerk to appoint pro 
bono counsel for Jaludi.  We express our appreciation to pro 
bono counsel for their very able representation of Mr. Jaludi. 
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II.7 
A. 
On appeal, Jaludi challenges only the District Court’s 
decision compelling arbitration of the Sarbanes–Oxley claim.  
Yet in his pro se complaint, Jaludi also pleaded a claim under 
RICO.  Jaludi’s RICO claim is subject to arbitration under 
either the 2009 or 2011 arbitration agreement.  See Suppl. App. 
71 (2009 arbitration agreement, providing that “all disputes 
arising out of or in any way related to employment” are 
arbitrable); see id. at 140 (2011 arbitration agreement, 
including “all disputes (other than disputes which by statute are 
not arbitrable) arising out of or in any way related to 
employment”).  Because Dodd–Frank did not limit Citigroup’s 
authority to enter into a pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate 
                                                 
7 We exercise plenary review over a district court’s 
order on a motion to compel arbitration.  White v. Sunoco, Inc., 
870 F.3d 257, 262 (3d Cir. 2017).  When reviewing a motion 
to compel arbitration, we use the standard for summary 
judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) 
“because the district court’s order . . . is in effect a summary 
disposition of the issue of whether or not there had been a 
meeting of the minds on the agreement to arbitrate.”  Id.  The 
district court should only grant a motion to compel arbitration 
“if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and, after 
viewing facts and drawing inferences in favor of the non-
moving party, the party moving to compel is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.”  Id. 
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RICO claims, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment as 
to the RICO claim. 
B. 
Jaludi’s Sarbanes–Oxley claim is a different story.  
Simply because “the parties have agreed to arbitrate some 
disputes does not necessarily manifest an intent to arbitrate 
every dispute that might arise between the parties.”  CardioNet, 
Inc. v. Cigna Health Corp., 751 F.3d 165, 172 (3d Cir. 2014). 
Jaludi contends that the District Court’s decision 
compelling arbitration of the Sarbanes–Oxley claim is 
incorrect because the 2011 arbitration agreement—the 
operative contract at the time of Citigroup’s allegedly 
retaliatory acts—precludes arbitration of Sarbanes–Oxley 
claims.  He explains that the 2011 arbitration agreement is 
contained within the 2011 Employee Handbook, which, by its 
own terms, supersedes the 2009 Handbook.  Jaludi also relies 
on Pennsylvania law, arguing that a subsequent arbitration 
agreement supersedes a prior arbitration agreement between 
the same parties covering the same subject matter.  See Collier 
v. Nat’l Penn Bank, 128 A.3d 307, 311 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015). 
For its part, Citigroup contends that the 2009 arbitration 
agreement applies because it indisputably mandates the 
arbitration of Sarbanes–Oxley claims.  Citigroup attempts to 
cast the arbitration agreements as separate from the Handbooks 
to which they are appended, arguing that the 2011 arbitration 
agreement does not say that it supersedes the 2009 arbitration 
agreement.  According to Citigroup, both the 2009 and 2011 
arbitration agreements can remain in effect because they are 
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consistent:  “the 2009 Arbitration Agreement requires 
arbitration of [Sarbanes–Oxley] claims and the 2011 
Arbitration Agreement requires arbitration of other claims but 
does nothing to disturb the obligation in the 2009 Arbitration 
Agreement.”  Appellee’s Br. 25. 
The 2009 and 2011 arbitration agreements are strikingly 
similar, save for their treatment of Sarbanes–Oxley claims.  
The 2009 arbitration agreement explicitly includes Sarbanes–
Oxley claims: 
The Policy makes arbitration the required and 
exclusive forum for the resolution of all disputes 
arising out of or in any way related to 
employment based on legally protected rights 
(i.e., statutory, regulatory, contractual, or 
common-law rights) that may arise between an 
employee or former employee and 
Citi . . . including, without limitation, claims, 
demands, or actions under . . . the Sarbanes–
Oxley Act of 2002, and all amendments thereto[.] 
Suppl. App. 71 (emphasis added).  Thus, if the 2009 arbitration 
agreement applies, a Sarbanes–Oxley claim that arose before 
Dodd–Frank would be subject to arbitration. 
The 2011 arbitration agreement—adopted after Dodd–
Frank—eliminates any reference by name to the Sarbanes–
Oxley Act: 
The Policy makes arbitration the required and 
exclusive forum for the resolution of all disputes 
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(other than disputes which by statute are not 
arbitrable) arising out of or in any way related to 
employment based on legally protected rights 
(i.e., statutory, regulatory, contractual, or 
common-law rights) that may arise between an 
employee or former employee and Citi . . . . 
Id. at 140 (emphasis added).  Citigroup does not dispute that, 
after Dodd–Frank, Sarbanes–Oxley claims cannot be included 
in pre-dispute arbitration agreements.  Thus, if the 2011 
arbitration agreement applies, Jaludi’s Sarbanes–Oxley claim 
is not subject to arbitration.8 
1. 
Turning first to the plain language of the 2011 
Employee Handbook, we conclude that the 2011 arbitration 
agreement supersedes the 2009 arbitration agreement.  The 
2011 Handbook provides: 
This Handbook supersedes any Employee 
Handbooks or Human Resources policies, 
practices or procedures that may have applied to 
you and that are inconsistent with and prior to 
this Handbook’s distribution. 
Id. at 96 (emphasis added); see also id. at 31 (2009 Handbook, 
containing almost identical language).  The 2011 arbitration 
                                                 
8 As pleaded in his pro se complaint, Jaludi’s Sarbanes–
Oxley claim arises from his termination—which occurred on 
April 21, 2013, after Dodd–Frank was enacted in July 2010. 
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agreement, which deletes the prior reference to Sarbanes–
Oxley claims and excludes claims that are not arbitrable by 
statute, is patently inconsistent with the prior 2009 agreement, 
which requires arbitration of Sarbanes–Oxley claims.  The 
2011 Employee Handbook thus by its plain language 
supersedes the 2009 Employee Handbook, at least as to the 
arbitration agreements.9 
The textual inconsistency between the agreements is not 
the only reason the 2011 arbitration agreement supersedes the 
2009 agreement.  After July 2010, arbitration of a Sarbanes–
Oxley claim that arose post-Dodd–Frank would violate the 
law.  The 2011 Handbook itself makes clear that when a 
conflict exists between the Handbook and applicable law, the 
law prevails.  See id. at 96 (“[T]he provisions of this Handbook 
don’t supersede any applicable law.”).  If the same language 
about the arbitrability of Sarbanes–Oxley claims were 
contained in the 2011 Handbook as is in the 2009 Handbook, 
it would violate the law insofar as it would amount to a pre-
dispute agreement to arbitrate Sarbanes–Oxley claims that 
arose after the passage of Dodd–Frank. 
Citigroup strains to reach the opposite conclusion—that 
the 2009 arbitration agreement applies.  Citigroup argues that 
we should consider the arbitration agreements separately from 
the Handbooks to which they are appended.  This argument is 
                                                 
9 This conclusion is reinforced elsewhere in the 2011 
Employee Handbook.  The 2011 Handbook provides that it 
does not supersede Citigroup’s Code of Conduct.  Citigroup 
could have chosen to preserve the 2009 arbitration agreement 
in a similar manner but declined to do so. 
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unpersuasive because the Handbooks explicitly integrate the 
arbitration agreements.  See id. at 31, 96 (“This Handbook 
contains a policy that requires you to submit employment-
related disputes to binding arbitration (see Appendix A).”); see 
also Standard Bent Glass Corp. v. Glassrobots Oy, 333 F.3d 
440, 443–44, 446–49 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding, under 
Pennsylvania’s Uniform Commercial Code, that an appended 
arbitration agreement was incorporated by reference into the 
contract even though one of the contracting parties had never 
received the appendix). 
In a further attempt to convince us that the arbitration 
agreements are separate from the Handbooks, Citigroup points 
to the fact that the arbitration agreements have their own 
procedures for amendment.  The 2009 and 2011 Handbooks 
contain a clause indicating that the arbitration agreements are 
governed by their own amendment provisions: 
Except for the Employment Arbitration Policy, 
which contains its own unique provisions, to 
meet the changing needs of both Citi and its 
employees, Citi reserves the right at any time to 
create, amend, supplement, modify, or rescind, 
in whole or in part, any policy, procedure, 
benefit, or provision of this Handbook, or the 
Handbook itself, as it deems appropriate, with or 
without notice. 
Suppl. App. 31 (emphasis added); see also id. at 96 (2011 
Handbook, containing almost identical language).  This 
language does not help Citigroup.  That the arbitration 
agreements contain their own amendment provisions does not 
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mean that the agreements are separate from the Handbooks in 
which they are contained. 
Moreover, the only amendment provision unique to the 
arbitration agreements is a thirty-day grace period before any 
amendments take effect: 
Citi reserves the right to revise, amend, modify, 
or discontinue the Policy at any time in its sole 
discretion with 30 [calendar] days’ written 
notice.  Such amendments may be made by 
publishing them in the Handbook or by separate 
release to employees and shall be effective 30 
calendar days after such amendments are 
provided to employees and will apply 
prospectively only.  Your continuation of 
employment after receiving such amendments 
shall be deemed acceptance of the amended 
terms. 
Id. at 75, 144 (alteration in 2011 policy only).  In other words, 
an amendment to the Employee Handbook goes into effect 
immediately, whereas an amendment to the arbitration 
agreement goes into effect after thirty days. 
We fail to see how this difference helps Citigroup, 
which indisputably followed the thirty-day amendment 
procedure here.  Citigroup published the 2011 arbitration 
agreement in the 2011 Handbook with instructions for 
employees to sign or acknowledge the Handbook within thirty 
days.  Jaludi dutifully did so; his continued employment was 
dependent upon acceptance of the revised terms.  Amendments 
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to the arbitration agreement were prospective only, and Jaludi 
was fired in April 2013—over two years after he 
acknowledged the 2011 Handbook. 
In short, Citigroup’s assertion that the 2009 and 2011 
arbitration agreements were meant to exist alongside one 
another strains credulity.  We conclude that the 2011 
arbitration agreement superseded the 2009 arbitration 
agreement and thus applies to this dispute. 
2. 
Our conclusion that the 2011 Employee Handbook, by 
its own terms, supersedes the 2009 Handbook is supported by 
both federal and state law.  But the parties disagree as to what 
body of law applies.  Citigroup urges us to apply federal law—
particularly the presumption of arbitrability—in an attempt to 
override the plain language of the Handbooks.  According to 
Jaludi, we should apply Pennsylvania law. 
We agree with Jaludi that state law applies.  Deciding 
whether arbitration is required is a two-step process:  in the first 
step, the court determines whether “there is an agreement to 
arbitrate,” and then in the second step, the court decides 
whether “the dispute at issue falls within the scope of that 
agreement.”  Century Indem. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at 
Lloyd’s, London, 584 F.3d 513, 523 (3d Cir. 2009).  The first 
step is governed by state law.  Id. at 524. 
The dispute here—whether Jaludi and Citigroup agreed 
to arbitrate Sarbanes–Oxley claims—centers on the first step.  
See id. at 523; see also First Options of Chi. v. Kaplan, 514 
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U.S. 938, 944 (1995) (“When deciding whether the parties 
agreed to arbitrate a certain matter (including arbitrability), 
courts generally . . . should apply ordinary state-law principles 
that govern the formation of contracts.”).  We thus apply 
“ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of 
contracts” to determine whether the subsequent arbitration 
agreement supersedes a prior agreement.  Century Indem. Co., 
584 F.3d at 524 (quoting First Options, 514 U.S. at 944); see, 
e.g., Dasher v. RBC Bank (USA), 745 F.3d 1111, 1122 (11th 
Cir. 2014); Applied Energetics, Inc. v. NewOak Capital Mkts., 
LLC, 645 F.3d 522, 526 (2d Cir. 2011).  In applying state law 
at step one, we do not invoke the presumption of arbitrability.  
See Century Indem. Co., 584 F.3d at 526–27; see also Dasher, 
745 F.3d at 1122; Applied Energetics, Inc., 645 F.3d at 526.  
At step two, however, “in applying general state-law principles 
of contract interpretation to the interpretation of an arbitration 
agreement . . . due regard must be given to the federal policy 
favoring arbitration.”  Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 
U.S. 468, 475 (1989). 
The presumption of arbitrability enters at the second 
step—it applies to disputes about the scope of an existing 
arbitration clause.  Century Indem. Co., 584 F.3d at 526–27; 
see White v. Sunoco, Inc., 870 F.3d 257, 262 (3d Cir. 2017) 
(“[T]he presumption of arbitrability applies only where an 
arbitration agreement is ambiguous about whether it covers the 
dispute at hand.  Otherwise, the plain language of the contract 
holds.”).  Here, the parties agree about the scope of the 
arbitration agreements—Jaludi is required to arbitrate his 
Sarbanes–Oxley claim under the 2009 arbitration agreement, 
but not under the 2011 agreement.  Applying the presumption 
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would thus put the cart before the horse.  See Granite Rock Co. 
v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 303 (2010) (“We have 
applied the presumption favoring arbitration . . . only where it 
reflects, and derives its legitimacy from, a judicial conclusion 
that arbitration of a particular dispute is what the parties 
intended because their express agreement to arbitrate was 
validly formed and . . . is . . . best construed to encompass the 
dispute.”). 
Citigroup relies heavily on First Liberty Investment 
Group v. Nicholsberg, in which we quoted the Fourth Circuit’s 
statement that “[w]hen a party seeking to avoid arbitration 
contends that the clause providing for arbitration has been 
superseded by some other agreement, the presumptions 
favoring arbitrability must be negated expressly or by clear 
implication.”  145 F.3d 647, 650 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting 
Zandford v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 112 F.3d 723, 727 
(4th Cir. 1997)).  Although this language at first blush seems 
to cut in Citigroup’s favor, it ultimately does not.  In 
Nicholsberg, we did not need to decide whether a later 
agreement superseded an earlier one because, in that case, both 
agreements obligated the parties to arbitrate their dispute.  See 
id. at 649–50.  Accordingly, because there was an agreement 
to arbitrate, the presumption in favor of arbitrability applied 
only to determine whether the dispute at hand fell within the 
scope of that agreement to arbitrate.  See id. at 653.  To the 
extent Citigroup’s preferred language from Nicholsberg could 
apply in a case such as this one, in which the existence of an 
agreement to arbitrate the dispute at hand depends on whether 
the later agreement superseded the prior agreement, that 
language is merely dicta.  Further, our post-Nicholsberg 
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precedent has made clear that we apply state law when 
determining whether there is an agreement to arbitrate.  See 
Century Indem. Co., 584 F.3d at 523–24.  We continue to do 
so here. 
Although our holding is merely an application of our 
prior precedent, see id. at 523, we make clear today that the 
question of whether a later agreement supersedes a prior 
arbitration agreement is tantamount to whether there is an 
agreement to arbitrate.  It is therefore a question to which state 
law, not federal law, applies.  Accord Dasher, 745 F.3d at 
1115–16 (applying state law to determine whether a later 
arbitration agreement superseded an earlier one because the 
dispute was about whether a contract had been made, not about 
scope); Applied Energetics, Inc., 645 F.3d at 526 (same). 
Under Pennsylvania law,10 the later of two agreements 
between the same parties as to the same subject matter 
generally supersedes the prior agreement.  See, e.g., In re 
Klugh’s Estate, 66 A.2d 822, 825 (Pa. 1949) (holding that the 
appellant had abandoned an option contained in the first lease 
                                                 
10 Although Citigroup contends that federal law applies, 
it does not dispute that, if we were to apply state law, the law 
of Pennsylvania is applicable.  Cf. Century Indem. Co. v. 
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 584 F.3d 513, 533 
(3d Cir. 2009) (“Though neither party explicitly states that 
Pennsylvania law applies to the question whether there is a 
valid arbitration agreement, they seem to agree that 
Pennsylvania law does apply, because, apart from federal 
cases, each predominantly cites Pennsylvania state court cases 
on the issues in this case.”). 
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by agreeing to three subsequent leases that lacked an option).  
This is true even if the first agreement includes an arbitration 
clause and the second agreement does not.  See Collier, 128 
A.3d at 311. 
In Collier, a customer sued a bank for improperly 
assessing overdraft fees.  Id. at 308.  The bank attempted to 
compel arbitration.  Id. at 309.  The trial court denied the 
bank’s petition to compel arbitration, holding that the later 
2010 Account Agreement controlled, rather than the 2008 
Account Agreement.  Id. at 309–11.  The Superior Court of 
Pennsylvania affirmed, explaining that the 2010 Agreement 
had superseded the 2008 Agreement.  Id. at 311.  Unlike the 
2008 Agreement, the 2010 Agreement did not contain an 
arbitration clause; instead, the 2010 Agreement provided that 
disputes would be resolved either by the bank or through 
litigation.  Id.  The Superior Court reasoned that the 2010 
Agreement “addresses the same subject matter as the 2008 
Agreement and is similarly comprehensive in its terms.”  Id.  
As such, the parties intended the 2010 Agreement to supersede 
the 2008 Agreement, “certainly with regard to judicial 
resolution of disputes in lieu of arbitration.”  Id.  The parties 
therefore had no agreement to arbitrate.  Id. 
So too here.  Reading the arbitration agreements in their 
entirety, the only reasonable conclusion is that Citigroup 
intended the 2011 arbitration agreement to supersede the 2009 
arbitration agreement.  The 2011 arbitration agreement largely 
tracks the 2009 arbitration agreement—except as to Sarbanes–
Oxley claims.  As discussed supra, the 2011 arbitration 
agreement removes its predecessor’s reference to Sarbanes–
Oxley claims and prohibits arbitration of claims that are not 
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arbitrable by statute; after July 2010, this prohibition included 
Sarbanes–Oxley claims.  See Applied Energetics, Inc., 645 
F.3d at 525 (holding that a later agreement that is silent on 
arbitration supersedes an earlier agreement providing for 
arbitration because “[b]oth provisions are all-inclusive, both 
are mandatory, and neither admits the possibility of the other”).  
We therefore hold that the 2011 arbitration agreement 
supersedes the 2009 agreement, that the 2011 agreement 
excludes Sarbanes–Oxley claims, and that the District Court 
thus erred by compelling arbitration of Jaludi’s Sarbanes–
Oxley claim.11 
III. 
The 2011 arbitration agreement, which excludes 
Sarbanes–Oxley claims, applies to Jaludi’s claims and 
supersedes the 2009 arbitration agreement.  The District Court 
erred in compelling arbitration of Jaludi’s Sarbanes–Oxley 
                                                 
11 Citigroup also contends that we should uphold the 
decision compelling arbitration so that an arbitrator may decide 
questions of arbitrability.  In its reply brief in the District Court, 
Citigroup first invoked a provision in the 2011 and 2009 
arbitration agreements requiring an arbitrator to decide 
arbitrability.  Even on appeal, Citigroup concedes “that the 
District Court was authorized to decide the questions of the 
arbitrability of the RICO and [Sarbanes–Oxley] claims, and 
that this Court may decide whether the District Court erred in 
compelling Jaludi’s claims to arbitration.”  Appellee’s Br. 43.  
Because Citigroup failed to invoke the provision until its reply 
brief in the District Court, we deem this argument waived. 
 24 
 
claim.  We will therefore affirm in part, reverse in part, and 
remand for further proceedings. 
 
 
